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DOUBLE JEOPARDY CONSEQUENCES
OF DISMISSALS
INTRODUCTION
The Constitution prohibits placing a defendant twice in jeopardy for
the same offense.1 The double jepoardy doctrine is ancient,2 and in
Anglo-American law has its roots in early common-law pleas.' A fun-
damental principle of the doctrine is the inability of the government to
appeal a judgment of acquittal in criminal cases.4 Whether a trial
judge's disposition of a case is indeed an acquittal, however, creates
problems of interpretation. A trial judge's dismissal of charges against
a criminal defendant presents this issue squarely. For purposes of
double jeopardy, it is necessary to determine if a dismissal operates like
an acquittal to bar government appeal. In United States v. Scott5 the
Supreme Court faced this issue and overruled a decision rendered only
three terms earlier in United States v. Jenkins.6
Section I of this Note briefly examines case law principles of double
jeopardy developed before the 1971 revision of the Criminal Appeals
Act.7 Section II analyzes the case law arising under the revised Act in
I. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "nor shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The provision
applies to both felonies and misdemeanors. Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). It
applies to the states through the 14th amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
2. The writings of Demosthenes and Justinian show that the general principle of double
jeopardy found expression in the laws of ancient Greece and Rome. See 11 S. Scorr, THE CIvIL
LAW 17 (1932). Early Canon law also evidences roots of the doctrine, in the notion that God does
not punish twice for the same offense. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 152 (1959); J. SIGLER,
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 1-3 (1969).
3. At common law, a plea of autrefoir acquit prevented reprosecution of a defendant who
could prove prior acquittal of the same offense. Similarly, a plea of autrefois convict prevented a
trial if the defendant could show a former conviction for the same crime. See J. SIGLER, supra
note 2, at 16, 18-20. See also United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975); Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184 (1957); United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1973), aft'd, 420 U.S. 358
(1975); Note, Government Appeals of "Dismisals"in Criminal Cases, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1822, 1823
n.4 (1974); Comment, Twice in Jeopard, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 262 n.1 (1965).
4. See, e.g., Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978); United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975); Fong Foo v.
United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); United States v.
Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) (dictum).
5. 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
6. 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976).
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light of these pre-1971 principles. Section III details the Court's rea-
soning in Scott. Section IV then evaluates the latest evolution in the
Court's changing double jeopardy doctrine.
I.
Statutory restrictions on both the government's and defendants'
rights of appeal in federal criminal cases precluded extensive judicial
gloss on the double jeopardy clause before 1971.8 Defendants in fed-
eral criminal trials first gained the right to appeal in 1889, but only in
capital cases.9 Three years later, the Supreme Court, relying on com-
mon-law restrictions on government appeals, held that the federal gov-
ernment could not appeal without specific statutory authority.'0
Wholly apart from any double jeopardy restrictions, therefore, the fed-
eral government was unable to appeal from trial court dispositions of
criminal cases until passage of the 1907 Criminal Appeals Act." That
Act allowed appeal when the underlying statute had been found inva-
lid or when the trial court termination was either an arrest of judgment
or the sustaining of a plea in bar.'2 Most of the litigation under this
8. "At the time the Fifth Amendment was adopted, its principles were easily applied, since
most criminal prosecutions proceeded to final judgment, and neither the United States nor the
defendant had any right to appeal an adverse verdict. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1
Stat. 84." United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 88 (1978). Before Congress revised the Criminal
Appeals Act in 1971, the Court had little opportunity or occasion to examine the double jeopardy
clause and its implications for government appeals. The former Criminal Appeals Act controlled
government appeals with little reference to the double jeopardy clause. United States v. Scott, 437
U.S. 82, 85 (1978). As a result,'only unusual fact patterns prompted consideration of the clause.
Id at 89. In addition, the double jeopardy clause did not apply to state criminal cases until 1969.
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969).
9. 437 U.S. at 88 (citing Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25 Stat. 656). "Two years later,
review was provided for all 'infamous' crimes. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 827." 437
U.S. at 88 n.4.
10. United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (1892). The trial court dismissed Sanges' indict-
ment for murder as insufficient to support a conviction. Id at 311. The Court held that the
absence of a federal statute authorizing government appeals precluded review of the dismissal.
Id at 321-23.
11. Criminal Appeals Act, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246 (1907).
12. Id The relevant portion of the Act reads as follows:
That a writ of error may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the
district or circuit courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all criminal
cases, in the following instances, to wit:
From a decision or judgment quashing, setting aside, or sustaining a demurrer to, any
indictment, or any count thereof, where such decision or judgment is based upon the
invalidity, or construction of the statute upon which the indictment is founded.
From a decision arresting a judgment of conviction for insufficiency of the indictment,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss1/8
Number 11 DOUBLE JEOPARDY
statute focused on the meaning of the two terms "arrest of judgment' 3
and "plea in bar."' 14 As a consequence, constitutional restrictions im-
posed by the double jeopardy clause played a relatively unimportant
role.'5
Thus, it is unsurprising that only three cases constitute the relevant,
pre-1971 case law concerning the constitutional limits on the govern-
ment's right to appeal in criminal cases. The seminal case, United
States v. Ball, 6 established two principles. First, the double jeopardy
clause does not prevent retrial of defendants who have won reversals of
their convictions on appeal.'7 Second, the double jeopardy clause pre-
vents retrial of a defendant acquitted by the trial court." Relying on
dicta in Ball,'9 the Supreme Court in Kepner v. United States2" held
that the double jeopardy clause bars government appeal from a judg-
where such decision is based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon
which the indictment is founded.
From the decision or judgment sustaining a special plea in bar when the defendant has
not been in jeopardy.
13. An arrest of judgment in a criminal trial is the refusal of the court to render judgment
because of a defect appearing on the face of the record. United States v. McCreery, 473 F.2d 1381
(7th Cir. 1973). Dispute over the term "arrest ofjudgment" focuses on what is meant by the "face
of the record." See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); United States v. Clay, 481
F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hill, 473 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1972). See generalo Note,
supra note 3.
14. A plea in bar set forth matters that per se destroyed the plaintiffs right of action and
barred its prosecution absolutely. United States v. Brodson, 234 F.2d 97, 99 (7th Cir. 1956). The
content of the plea and its effect determined whether it was a plea in bar within the meaning of the
Criminal Appeals Act. Id Cases finding pleas to be pleas in bar include United States v. Mur-
dock, 284 U.S. 141, 147 (1931) (plea raised constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination);
United States v. Goldman, 277 U.S. 299 (1928) (statute of limitations plea). Litigation over this
term centered on whether a particular plea was a plea in bar or a plea in abatement, which did not
bar reprosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Barber, 219 U.S. 72 (1911); United States v. Brodson,
234 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1953).
15. See United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970); United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868
(2d Cir. 1973), aft'd, 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
16. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
17. Id at 672.
18. Id at 671.
19. Id at 670 ("If the judgment is upon an acquittal, the defendant, indeed, will not seek to
have it reversed; and the government cannot.") (citing United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310
(1892)).
20. 195 U.S. 100 (1904). Congress had incorporated the double jeopardy clause into provi-
sions enacted for rule of the Phillipines, where defendant was tried for embezzlement. Although
defendant was acquitted at trial, Phillipine appellate procedure called for a trial de novo. Techni-
cally, the ruling in this case is not binding as constitutional interpretation, but is binding only on
later cases involving construction of the same provision of the code imposed on the Philippines.
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ment of acquittal, regardless of statutory authorization.2' Fong Foo P.
United States22 reaffirmed and expanded Kepner. The Court was un-
able to determine the basis for Fong Foo's directed verdict of acquit-
tal; 23 nevertheless, it held that a verdict of acquittal was final even if the
trial court was powerless to direct acquittal or was egregiously errone-
ous.
24
All three cases are consistent with what has been labeled the original
or primary2s purpose of the double jeopardy clause-preservation of
the integrity of a final judgment.26 This rationale provides a theoretical
In United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975), however, the Court accepted Kepner as having
correctly stated the relevant double jeopardy principles. Id. at 346 n. 15.
One of the arguments explicitly rejected by the Kepner Court was the concept of "continuing
jeopardy." United States v. Kepner, 195 U.S. 100, 132-33 (1904). Articulated by Mr. Justice
Holmes in his dissenting opinion, id. at 134-37 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting), this notion views
the term "trial" broadly to include all proceedings against the defendant arising out of his initial
indictment. Thus, a government appeal and any resulting proceedings simply would be a continu-
ation of the first trial. The doublejeopardy clause presumably would bar retrial only after a final
determination from a court of last resort. Id The Court again expressly rejected continuing jeop-
ardy in United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 369 (1975).
21. 195 U.S. 100, 133 (1904).
22. 369 U.S. 141 (1962). On the seventh day of what showed every indication of being a long
and complicated trial, the trial judge interrupted testimony by a government witness and directed
a verdict of acquittal. This witness had stated that he was unsure of the date of a certain confer-
ence. During a recess one of the prosecuting attorneys apparently refreshed the witness' memory,
for the witness gave the date on resuming the stand. On cross-examination, the witness admitted
that the government's attorney had called his attention to the date. The trial judge excused the
jury, reprimanded the prosecutor, called the jury back, and directed a verdict of acquittal. Id at
144-46 (Clark, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 142. The Court was uncertain whether the trial court based its action on
prosecutorial misconduct, lack of credibility of the government's witnesses, or both. Id
24. Id at 143. This holding becomes problematic in light of the emphasis later opinions put
on the nature of an acquittal as a resolution of facts meaningfully demonstrating the innocence of
the accused. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978); United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977). Obviously, an acquittal such as the one in Fong Foe does not
mean that the accused has been found factually innocent in any meaningful sense of the word. See
Note, Double Jeopardy Consequences ofMistrial, Dismissal and Reversal of Conviction on Appeal,
16 AM. CRIM. L. REy. 235 (1979).
Mr. Justice Clark dissented in FongFoo, arguing that the double jeopardy clause posed no bar
to appeal because the court below had no power to direct an acquittal. 369 U.S. at 144 (Clark, J.,
dissenting). This approach, too, is problematic. Some review would be necessary to determine if
the court below had indeed been without power to direct the acquittal, or to determine if the
acquittal was "egregiously erroneous." Id.
25. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978).
See also Mayers & Yarbrough, Bix Vexar" New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARv. L.
REV. 1 (1960).
26. Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962); United States v. Kepner, 195 U.S. 100
(1904); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). See notes 16-24 supra and accompanying text.
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basis for barring reprosecution of a defendant for the same offense fol-
lowing a judgment of acquittal.27 Because the inevitable result of a
successful government appeal from a judgment of acquittal would be
reprosecution, this view of the clause's underlying purpose would also
bar appeals of acquittals. Repeated prosecution of a defendant for the
same offense allows the government to shop around for a sympathetic
factfinder 8 and increases the likelihood that an innocent defendant
may be found guilty. 9 Finality of a judgment of acquittal, ensured by
the double jeopardy clause, prevents the government from capitalizing
on this increased probability. One commentator has noted that re-
peated prosecutions would lower the government's high burden of per-
suasion in criminal cases.3" Thus, the double jeopardy clause is an
integral part of a criminal justice system structured to minimize the
possibility that an innocent defendant might be found guilty.3'
A second view regards prevention of government harassment of de-
27. Ball's other holding, that the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial of one who has
gained reversal of a conviction on appeal, is also consistent with the finality purpose because of
the absence of a judgment of acquittal by the original factfinder. See note 17 supra and accompa-
nying text.
28. See Comment, supra note 3, at 267.
29. There are a number of reasons a retrial enhances the risk that "even though inno-
cent, [the criminal defendant] may be found guilty.". . . A retrial affords the Govern-
ment the opportunity to reexamine the weaknesses of its first presentation in order to
strengthen the second. And, as would any litigant, the Government has been known to
take advantage of this opportunity. It is not uncommon to find that prosecution wit-
nesses change their testimony, not always subtly, at second trials.
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 105 n.4 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally Note,
supra note 3, at 1837-39; Comment, supra note 3, at 278 n.74; see also Schectman v. Foster, 172
F.2d 339, 341 (2d Cir. 1949) ("Due process of law does not mean infallible process of law.") (L.
Hand, J.).
30. Note, supra note 3, at 1838.
31, American public law is deliberately weighted in favor of defendants accused of
crime.... Indeed, our law is generally described as a defendant's law, in contrast with
other legal systems which emphasize the necessities of the prosecution and give priority
to the interests of society in the apprehension and conviction of criminals.
D. FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANt'S RIGHTS TODAY 3 (2d ed. 1976). See generally Packer, Two Mod-
els of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1964). Packer sets up two different model
criminal justice systems, the due process model and the crime control model. The due process
model stresses the possibility of error in the factfnding process and views the criminal process as
an appropriate forum for correcting its own abuses; thus, the possibility of legal innocence is
expanded enormously. The crime control model, on the other hand, is less concerned with the
possibility of error and will allow conviction much more readily. According to Packer, courts tend
to give deference to the due process model when confronted by issues evidencing tension between
the two models. Accord, D. FELLMAN, supra, at 22-23. Packer also lists a number of principles to
which he refers as guilt-defeating doctrines, ie., doctrines of the due process model that allow a
person who is factually guilty to go free. Double jeopardy is one of these doctrines. See also
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fendants as the double jeopardy clause's primary purpose.3 2 The prin-
ciples established by Ball, Kepner, and Fong Foo are also consistent
with this view? 3 Reprosecution subjects a defendant to harassment in
the form of increased expense, continuing distress, and increased dam-
age to reputation.34 Under this second view, the double jeopardy
clause mitigates the imbalance of adversary capability between grossly
unequal litigants.35 The possibility of harassment also perverts the pre-
sumption of innocence; ajudgment of acquittal would be of small com-
fort to one repeatedly forced to prove innocence.3 6
These two perceptions of the underlying purpose, though distinct, are
related. 7 When a judgment is final, a defendant is free from the threat
of harassment. When appeal or reprosecution is barred to prevent har-
assment, the trial court's disposition of a case is final. The issue of
whether the double jeopardy clause bars government appeals of dismis-
sals, however, reveals differences between the two purposes that affect
application of the clause. If prevention of harassment is the primary
purpose, it is relatively unimportant that a dismissal is not a final deter-
mination of guilt or innocence. 38 Further proceedings following a dis-
missal would expose defendant to the evils condemned in Green v.
United States:39 continuing embarrassment, expense, ordeal, anxiety,
Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58, 65 (W.D.N.C. 1969) ("Crime prevention is not an absolute
value."), vacated, 401 U.S. 987 (1971).
32. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 104-05 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United
States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 370 (1975); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957); Note,
Double Jeopardy" Multoi'le ProsecutionsArisingfrom the Same Transaction, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
259 (1978); Comment, supra note 3, at 277.
This view is best expressed in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system
ofjurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed
to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby sub-
jecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a con-
tinuing state of anxiety and insecurity.
Id at 187-88. But see Note, supra note 3, at 1837 (concluding that this view is inappropriate).
33. See notes 16-24 supra and accompanying text. Although reprosecution of a defendant
who has won reversal of a conviction on appeal is not harassment per se, it leaves open the possi-
bility of harassment. Thus, the harassment purpose does not fully explain this aspect of Ball See
note 17 supra and accompanying text; c. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (reversal of
conviction on appeal on grounds of insufficient evidence bars retrial).
34. Comment, supra note 3, at 277-79.
35. See id. at 277-78.
36. Id. at 278.
37. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
38. See notes 24-36 supra and accompanying text.
39. 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
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and confusion. ° In contrast, a judgment of acquittal is central to the
finality purpose." On the surface, therefore, a double jeopardy bar to
government appeal of dismissals would arise only if prevention of har-
assment is deemed the clause's primary purpose. Congress' complete
revision42 of the Criminal Appeals Act in 197 113 rendered this issue of
more than merely academic interest. Particularly concerned with the
government's inability to appeal certain kinds of dismissals and sup-
pressions," Congress clarified confusing portions45 of the existing Act
and removed seemingly arbitrary statutory bars to government ap-
peals.46 The legislative history of the revision reveals that Congress
40. Id
41. See note 27 supra.
42. Congress had amended the Act slightly four times before this complete revision. In 1928
Congress replaced the outdated term "writ of error" with the term "right of appeal." In 1942
Congress brought cases involving informations under the Act, which formerly had included only
cases brought up on indictment. In 1948 Congress made a few technical changes in the wording of
the Act so that it conformed to the language used in rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. In 1968 Congress allowed appeals in some cases from adverse rulings on motions to
suppress. None of these changes affected, in practice, the substantive provisions of the Act. See S.
REP. No. 1296, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976). The relevant portion of the Act now reads:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a
decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or information
as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy
clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.
44. Id "The first major problem that has arisen under the present statute concerns the total
lack of appealability of certain kinds of dismissals and suppressions." S. REP. No. 1296, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970). See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 578-80
(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring); 116 CONG,. REc. 35658 (1970).
45. "[One] problem is the ambiguity and absence of settled meaning surrounding many of
the statute's existing provisions, which result in a considerable and needless expenditure of
prosecutive and judicial resources." S. REP. No. 1296, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970). See 116
CONG, REC. 35658 (1970).
46. "S. 3132 will afford the Government the right of appeal from the dismissal of a criminal
prosecution in all cases where the decision rendered by the district judge does not result in an
acquittal after jeopardy." S. REP. No. 1296, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970). The bill will allow an
appeal from any dismissal except one amounting to a judgment of acquittal. 116 CONG. REC.
35659 (1970).
In discussing the arbitrariness of the old act in allowing government appeals, Congress gave the
following example:
[TIhe present law prohibits an appeal by the Government from a wide range of adverse
determinations if those determinations are made after jeopardy has attached. . . even
though the court's ruling has nothing to do with the factual issues in the case, and even
though the ruling terminating the trial is entered at the defendant's request, so that a
governmental appeal would in no way affect the defendant's right not to be placed in
double jeopardy, or his right to proceed to verdict before the original jury.
116 CONG. REc. 35659 (1970). The committee seemed to be anticipating the fact pattern that
arose in United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978). See notes 131-33 infra and accompanying text.
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intended the double jeopardy clause as the sole restriction on govern-
ment appeals.47 Although courts eagerly anticipated the new statute4 8
and met it with enthusiasm, 49 the constitutional questions inevitably
raised by the new Act quickly proved to be no less difficult than con-
struction of the previous statutory restrictions.
II.
Two cases, United States v. Wilson50 and United States v. Jenkins,5t
afforded the Supreme Court its first opportunity to decide double jeop-
ardy issues arising under the revised Act. Decided the same day,52 both
cases concerned government appeals from dismissals.5 3 Wilson54 held
that government appeal of a dismissal entered after a jury returns a
verdict of guilty is consistent with the double jeopardy clause.5 5 Jen-
kins,56 however, held57 that the double jeopardy clause bars appeal
47. "As a result [of adoption of the amendment], review of a lower court dismissal will be
precluded only where the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution mandates it." S. REP. No.
1296, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970). Read together with the legislative history cited in notes 43-46
supra, this language indicates Congress' belief that allowing appeals except when the defendant
has been acquitted is the equivalent of allowing appeals in every constitutionally permissible situ-
ation.
48. See United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 308-09 (1970).
49. See United States v. Weller, 401 U.S. 254, 255 n.l (1971). ("The end of our problems
with this Act is finally in sight.").
50. 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
51. 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
52. Id at 360.
53. Id at 359; United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 333 (1975).
54. Wilson was accused of converting union funds for personal use. The treasurer and presi-
dent of the union had endorsed the check at issue. More than five years passed before the matter
came to trial. By that time the union treasurer had died and a terminal illness prevented the union
president from testifying. Wilson made a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment on grounds
that preindictment delay had so prejudiced him that a fair trial was impossible. The motion was
tentatively denied and ajury found Wilson guilty. Subsequently, the trial court reversed its earlier
ruling and dismissed the indictment on grounds of preindictment delay and resulting prejudice.
420 U.S. at 334-35.
55. Id at 336.
56. Jenkins was ordered to report for induction and his draft board refused his request for
postponement to allow him to claim conscientious objector classification. He refused to report for
induction and was indicted. 420 U.S. at 360.
57. The trial court ruled that under the law as it stood at the time of trial, the board was not
required to consider conscientious objector claims arising between the notice of induction and the
induction date. Id at 362. See Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99 (1971). Nevertheless, because
Ehlert had not been decided when Jenkins refused to report, the trial court said that it would be
unfair to apply Ehlert to Jenkins. 420 U.S. at 362. The Supreme Court found it unclear whether
the district court had found that Jenkins lacked the proper mens tea-the law required that one
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from a dismissal entered after a bench trial that did not result in a
factual finding of guilt or innocence.5 8 Together the cases establish
prevention of multiple prosecutions of a defendant for the same offense
as the underlying purpose of the double jeopardy clause.59 Successful
government appeal in Wilson would require only reinstatement of the
jury's verdict, not reprosecution.e Consequently, the double jeopardy
clause did not bar government appeal. In contrast, no such reinstate-
ment was possible in Jenkins.6 The Court found that reversal of the
dismissal would require further resolution "of factual issues going to
the elements of the offense charged."62 Even if this resolution did not
require the receipt of additional evidence on remand, the necessary
"supplemental findings" would violate double jeopardy.63
The double jeopardy limits on government appeals established in
Jenkins were destined to be short-lived. United States v. Martin Linen
SUpply Co.64 and Lee v. United States65 laid the foundation for the
reversal of Jenkins just three terms after it was decided.66 In Martin
Linen the Court held that the double jeopardy clause barred govern-
ment appeal of a rule 29(c) judgment of acquittal67 entered after a mis-
knowingly refuse to submit--or whether the decision not to apply Ehlert was simply a decision on
what law was applicable. Id at 363 n.3.
58. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 370 (1975).
59. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 366-70 (1975); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S.
332, 336, 343-53 (1975).
In Wilson the Court concluded that the original understanding of the double jeopardy clause's
underlying purpose was that it operated to prevent multiple prosecutions. Id. at 343-44. The
Court read Ball, Kepner, and Fong Foo as reaching the same conclusion, id at 345-48, rejecting
defendant's argument that the cases "stand for the proposition that the key to invoking double
jeopardy protection is not whether defendant might be subjected to multiple trials, but whether he
can point to a prior verdict or judgment of acquittal." Id at 346-47. See notes 16-24 supra and
accompanying text.
60. 420 U.S. at 345, 352-53.
61. 420 U.S. at 368.
62. Id at 370.
63. Id
64. 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
65. 432 U.S. 23 (1977).
66. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 86-87 (1978).
67. This rule provides:
If the jury returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict, a
motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is
discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period. If a
verdict of guilty is returned, the court may on such motion set aside the verdict and enter
judgment of acquittal. If no verdict is returned the court may enter judgment of acquit-
tal. It shall not be necessary to the making of such a motion that a similar motion has
been made prior to the submission of the case to the jury.
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trial resulting from a hopelessly deadlocked jury.68 To reach this
conclusion, the Court first established that the acquittal, not the mis-
trial, terminated proceedings in the trial court.69 The Court was thus
able to avoid the distinction between mistrials and terminations "in the
defendant's favor" that Jenkins found to be of "critical importance" in
application of the double jeopardy clause.70 With the mistrial issue re-
solved, Martin Linen presented a situation essentially identical to Jen-
kins-a trial court termination in defendant's favor without a factual
resolution of guilt or innocence. 7' Yet, the Court did not regard Jen-
kins as dispositive, despite the inevitable necessity of reprosecution
should the government prevail on appeal.7 2 Instead, the Court felt
compelled to consider whether the rule 29(c) acquittal "represent[ed] a
resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the
offense charged. 7 If the trial court's judgment of acquittal fulfilled
this definition, the fundamental rule established in Ball, Kepner, and
Fong Foo would apply and would bar government appeal.74 Satisfied
that the trial court's dispostion was an acquittal in substance as well as
FED. R. CIIM. P. 29(c). Rule 29 replaces the directed verdict of acquittal mechanism employed in
Fong Foo. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 573 (1977). See notes 22-24
supra and accompanying text.
68. 430 U.S. at 575.
69. Id at 570; cf. Comment, supra note 3, at 286 n. 115, 287 (retrial following hung jury is one
of two most frequently occurring classes of permissible reprosecutions).
70. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 365 n.7 (1975). In its summary treatment of this
issue, the majority in Martin Linen did not even allude to the Jenkins distinction. 430 U.S. at 570.
Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Martin Linen on this precise question, also ignored the Jenkins
distinction. Id. at 581-83 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Not participating in Martin Linen, Justice
Rehnquist, author of Jenkins, later commented that Martin Linen's circumvention of his "bright
line" distinction between mistrials and dismissals undercut Jenkins so substantially that he felt
free to completely reevaluate his views on the double jeopardy limits on government appeals from
dismissals. Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 36-37 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). See notes
108-12 infra and accompanying text.
71. See notes 56-57 supra and accompanying text.
72. 430 U.S. at 570-71.
73. Id at 571. The Court in Lee and United States v. Scott accepted this language as a
complete definition of acquittal. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97 (1978); Lee v. United
States, 432 U.S. 23, 30 n.8 (1977). Dissenting in Scott, Justice Brennan, author of the majority
opinion in Martin Linen, contended that this language was never intended as a definition embrac-
ing all situations. 437 U.S. at I11-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See note 75 infra. See also Note,
supra note 3, at 1825 n.21. "An acquittal is generally defined as a ruling on the merits by which
the defendant is discharged from prosecution .... An acquittal does not necessarily have to re-
sult from a judgment after a full trial." Id
74. 430 U.S. at 571.
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form, and thus within the definition,75 the Court affirmed the court of
appeals' dismissal of the government's appeal.76
In Lee v. United States7 7 the Court reanalyzed its holding in Jenkins.
This reexamination shifted the focus of the double jeopardy inquiry
from the consequence of a successful government appeal78 to the na-
ture of the trial court's termination of proceedings against defendant.79
The critical question in applying Jenkins, according to the Lee major-
ity, was whether the trial court's disposition "contemplate[d] an end to
all prosecution of the defendant for the offense charged."8 If so, the
trial court proceedings would have terminated in defendant's favor and
would bar government appeal.8' Further, any "midtrial dismissal...
granted on the ground, correct or not, that the defendant simply cannot
be convicted of the offense charged" would be a termination in defend-
ant's favor.82 The label attached by the trial court to its action, how-
ever, was not controlling.83 On the facts of Lee, the Court found the
trial court's dismissal of the indictment functionally indistinguishable
from a mistrial.84 In contrast to dismissals, which may or may not ter-
minate trial court proceedings in defendant's favor, a manifestly neces-
75. Id at 572. It is difficult to reconcile the plain meaning of the Court's "definition" with its
application in Martin Linen. First, the discharge of the "'hopelessly deadlocked' "jury precluded
any resolution of factual elements of the offense charged by the factfinder. Id at 565. Second, the
Court concluded "that the District Court ... evaluated the Government's evidence and deter-
mined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction." Id at 572. That is a conclusion of
law, not a resolution of facts. Finally, the Court found that a rule 29 acquittal was "'a legal
determination on the basis of facts adduced at the trial relating to the general issue of the case.'"
Id at 575 (quoting United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 290 n.19 (1970)). In Scott Justice Bren-
nan asserted that this last formulation was the traditional and intended definition of "acquittal."
437 U.S. at 111-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. 430 U.S. at 576.
77. 432 U.S. 23 (1977). Lee was charged with theft. The information did not allege that Lee
intended to deprive the victim of his property permanently. After jeopardy had attached defend-
ant moved for dismissal of the information because of the omission. Id at 25-26. The trial judge
tentatively denied the motion, but said he would reconsider the matter at the first opportunity.
After all the evidence was in, the judge called a recess, researched the matter, and returned to
dismiss the information because of the defect. Id at 26.
78. See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text.
79. The Court's new approach is similar to that argued by defendant in Wilson and rejected
by the Court. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 346-47 (1975); note 59 supra.
80. 432 U.S. at 30.
81. Id See United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 365 n.7 (1975); note 70 supra.
82. 432 U.S. at 30.
83. Id
84. Id at 31.
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sary mistrial85 ruling invariably contemplates defendant's
reprosecution.86 Thus, neither Jenkins87 nor the double jeopardy
clause barred Lee's retrial despite the trial court's dismissal of the in-
dictment before resolving the issue of guilt or innocence. 88
In its development of the double jeopardy limits on government ap-
peals from Wilson to Lee, the Court's emphasis on finality and elimina-
tion of harassment has varied.89 Prevention of multiple prosecutions
for the same offense--established in Wilson as the underlying purpose
of the double jeopardy clause--comprehends both finality and har-
assment concerns. The Wilson Court indicated its perception of the
dual nature of the clause by negative inference in failing to find explic-
itly either harassment 9' or finality 92 concerns applicable to the circum-
stances of the case. Although Wilson appeared to weight finality and
harassment equally, both Jenkins and Martin Linen seemed to assign
85. A mistrial is manifestly necessary when it results from compelling circumstances beyond
the control of the court, such as bad faith conduct by a prosecutor. Retrial following a manifestly
necessary mistrial does not violate the double jeopardy clause. See Arizona v. Washington, 434
U.S. 497 (1978); Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458
(1973); United States v. Join, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579
(1824); Note, supra note 3, at 1838-40.
86. 432 U.S. at 30.
87. Id at 31.
88. Id at 34.
In Illinois v. Somerlle. . . a state prosecutor made precisely the same mistake as was
made in this case in drafting an indictment for theft. Discovery of the defect in the
course of trial led the trial court to declare a mistrial over the defendant's objection. We
held that termination of the trial was dictated by "manifest necessity" under the standard
first articulated in United States v. Perez. . . . There is no reason to believe that Somer-
ville would have been analyzed differently if the trial judge, like the District Court here,
had labeled his action a "dismissal" rather than a mistrial. In Jenkins we referred specif-
ically to Somerville in distinguishing proceedings that end in mistrials from those that
end "in the defendant's favor."
Id at 31 n.9. See note 85 supra.
89. See notes 25-36 supra and accompanying text.
90. See notes 59-63 supra and accompanying text.
91. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975). "Correction of an error of law at that
stage would not grant the prosecutor a new trial or subject the defendant to the harassment tradi-
tionally associated with multiple prosecutions." Id
92. Id.
Granting the Government such broad appeal rights would allow the prosecutor to seek
to persuade a second trier of fact of defendant's guilt after having failed with the first; it
would permit him to reexamine the weaknesses in his first presentation in order to
strengthen the second; and it would disserve the defendant's legitimate interest in the
finality of a verdict of acquittal. These interests, however, do not apply in the case of a
postverdict ruling of law by a trial judge.
Id (footnote omitted).
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greater importance to the prevention of harassment. The Court erected
a double jeopardy bar to government appeals in Jenkins simply be-
cause of the necessity for further proceedings should the government
prevail on appeal.93 In stressing the need to "limit the government to a
single criminal proceeding," Martin Linen also emphasized the preven-
tion of harassment.94 Multiple prosecutions of a defendant for the
same offense, according to the Court in Martin Linen, would afford the
government a "potent instrument of oppression. '9 5
The analytical shift in Lee96 refocused the Court's attention on final-
ity at the expense of harassment. Sanction of Lee's retrial and convic-
tion, although consistent with traditional double jeopardy doctrine on
mistrials,97 is incompatible with the dismissals rule established in Jen-
kins98 as well as a strict view of the prevention-of-harassment pur-
pose. 9 If the Lee Court had focused solely on the harassment purpose,
however, it would have accorded finality to a trial court termination
distinguishable from a mistrial only by the trial court's label.1 ° To
avoid this result, the Court was forced to consider exactly what sort of
dismissals were final for double jeopardy purposes.
In Lee's reformulation of Jenkins, the idea of convictability is at the
crux of finality. A mid-trial dismissal based on a determination that
defendant is not convictable is final and defendant may not be sub-
jected to further proceedings before a second factfinder 1 0 Interest-
ingly, this determination is final regardless of whether it is based on a
resolution of facts, law, or mixed questions of fact and law. 0 2 In addi-
tion, this determinatin of non-convictability may be independent of the
93. See notes 38-40, 61-63 supra and accompanying text.
94. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977).
95. Id
96. See notes 77-79 supra and accompanying text.
97. See note 85 supra.
98. See notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text.
99. See notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text.
100. 432 U.S. at 30-31.
101. See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
102. 432 U.S. at 30. See Note, supra note 3, at 1839 n.125. A dismissal makes it difficult to
determine:
whether a ruling by the judge is a finding of fact or is entirely a ruling of law, since most
dismissals involve mixed questions of fact and law. The purpose of not allowing appeal
from dismissals based on favorable findings of disputed fact is primarily to preserve
favorable inferences from the evidence. Thus the concept of favorable fact findings may
extend beyond simple credibility resolutions to include intermediate inferences, even
when the basic evidence is undisputed.
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question whether defendant actually committed the offense charged.'0 3
Consequently, a factually guilty defendant could conceivably benefit
from an erroneous conclusion of law that would be insulated from re-
view by Lee's double jeopardy limits on government appeals.'0
Although Lee does not explicitly recognize this result, the conclusion
derives directly from the Court's reading of Jenkins.I5 Even if the trial
court's dismissal in Jenkins was grounded solely on an erroneous con-
ception of the law, the Jenkins Court found a double jeopardy bar to
government appeal. 06 Having failed to persuade the first trier of fact,
the government was barred from capitalizing on the enhanced
probability of conviction before a second trier of fact. 107 Despite its
analytical shift, therefore, the Court's reasoning in Lee reached conclu-
sions harmonious with results produced by the analysis in Jenkins.
Concurring in Lee, Justice Rehnquist, author of the Jenkins decision,
signaled that the Court's development of the limits on government ap-
peals of dismissals remained unfinished.'08 He found the reformula-
tion in Lee acceptable because his assumptions, "made when writing
Jenkins and voting in Wilson," did not survive Martin Linen, a decision
in which he did not participate. 10 9 In his view, the Marin Linen
Court's decision to ignore the mistrial in analyzing the constitutional
significance of a rule 29(c) acquittal circumvented a "bright line" that
Jenkins drew between mistrials and dismissals."10 Consequently, he
103. See notes 106-07 infra and accompanying text.
104. This result is contrary to the congressional understanding of the double jeopardy clause.
The legislative history of the revised Criminal Appeals Act reveals Congress' belief that any termi-
nation of trial at defendant's request, not based on a resolution of factual issues, would be appeal-
able under the new Act. See note 46 supra.
105. Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 30 (1977).
106. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 370 (1975).
107. Id See also United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975).
108. Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 36-37 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
109. Id
110. Id Justice Rehnquist maintained that Jenkins barred government appeal and reprosecu.
tion of defendant if the dismissal occurred during the fact finding stage of trial, but that govern-
ment appeal and reprosecution were permissible if the dismissal occurred after the factfinding
stage. Because in Marlin Linen the acquittal-which Rehnquist would not treat differently from a
dismissal--came after the factfinding stage was completed, Jenkins would have allowed appeal.
The Court in Martin Linen, however, held a rule 29 acquittal barred appeal whenever it was
declared. Id
There are two problems with Rehnquist's analysis. First, he implies that the dismissal in Jen-
kins occurred during the factfinding stage, Id The dismissal, however, was entered after the close
of the evidence, after the parties submitted proposed findings, and after the court filed written
findings of fact. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 362 (1975). Second, Rehnquist offers no
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felt no compulsion to adhere any longer to Jenkins and felt free to reex-
amine the Court's newly established doctrine.' In United States v.
Scott" '2 Justice Rehnquist's reevaluation carried a majority of the
Court, resulting in a reversal of Jenkins and a substantial revision of
Lee.
III.
Indicted on a three-count narcotics violation, Scott moved to dismiss
the indictment on grounds of preindictment delay.13 After all the evi-
dence had been presented, the trial court granted defendant's motion
on two counts, but submitted the third count to the jury, which re-
turned a verdict of not guilty." 4 The court of appeals, relying on Jen-
kins, ruled that the double jeopardy clause barred government appeal
of the two dismissals."I The Supreme Court reversed and held that the
government may appeal a defendant's successful effort to have his trial
terminated on grounds unrelated to factual guilt or innocence when
this termination occurs before the factflinder's resolution of defendant's
guilt or innocence."16
Overruling Jenkins,"I7 the Court reexamined the roles of finality and
prevention of harrassment in necessitating application of the double
jeopardy clause. By misperceiving those roles, Jenkins, according to
the Court, overemphasized defendant's right to have the issue of guilt
decided by the first factfinder impaneled to try him. Consequently, the
double jeopardy clause was applied overbroadly to bar government ap-
peal in those cases in which defendant sought to terminate the trial
before a verdict on grounds unrelated to factual guilt or innocence." 81
Scott's reconstruction of the double jeopardy limits on government
appeals rests on two conclusions about the proper roles for finality and
the prevention of harassment: (1) the concern for the prevention of
harassment of defendants is irrelevant when it is defendant's own mo-
rationale for equating the judgment of acquittal with a dismissal. See Lee v. United States, 432
U.S. 23, 36-37 (1977) (Rehnquist, I., concurring).
111. 432 U.S. at 37.
112. 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
113. Id at 84.
114. Id
115. Id
116. Id at 98-99, 101.
117. Id at 87.
118. Id
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tion that terminates the first proceeding before a factfinder after jeop-
ardy has attached;" 9 and (2) only those terminations representing a
resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the
offense charged are final and, thus, preclude government appeal.' 20
The Court's conclusion concerning harassment was imported from
double jeopardy doctrine concerning mistrials.12 ' Although a mistrial
generally must be manifestly necessary to permit retrial,122 "'a motion
by the defendant for a mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any
barrier to reprosecution, even if the defendant's motion is necessitated
by a prosecutorial or judicial error.' 123 Because the defendant retains
primary control over the consequences of any error necessitating a mis-
trial, his deliberate choice to seek a mistrial ruling obviates any possi-
bility of government harassment. 24 The Court saw no reason not to
apply this reasoning to a defendant's successful motion for a dismis-
sal 25 and read Lee to hold "that, at least in some cases, the dismissal of
an indictment may be treated on the same basis as the declaration of a
mistrial."' z Quite simply, the Court held the defendant responsible for
the second prosecution that would inevitably follow a successful gov-
ernment appeal of a dismissal. 27 Because it failed to account ade-
quately for defendant's choice, control, and responsibility, Jenkins
sacrificed the public's "valued right to 'one complete opportunity to
convict those who have violated its laws.' "128
To the Scot majority, Jenkins not only overemphasized concern
about harassment, but also "pressed too far. . . the concept of the 'de-
fendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribu-
119. See notes 121-28 infra and accompanying text.
120. See notes 129-33 infra and accompanying text.
121. 437 U.S. at 92-94.
122. Id at 92-93. See note 85 supra.
123. 437 U.S. at 93 (quoting United States v. Join, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971)).
124. Id. (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 (1976)).
125. Id. at 94-96, 98-99.
126. Id at 94.
127. Id at 96.
This is scarcely a picture of an all-powerful state relentlessly pursuing a defendant who
had either been found not guilty or who had at least insisted on having the issue of guilt
submitted to the first trier of fact. It is instead a picture of a defendant who chooses to
avoid conviction and imprisonment, not because of his assertion that the Government
has failed to make out a case against him, but because of a legal claim that the Govern-
ment's case against him must fail even though it might satisfy the trier of fact that he was
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id
128. Id. at 100 (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978)).
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nal.' "=129 As a result, Jenkins exceeded the mandate of the double
jeopardy clause and accorded finality to cases in which there had been
no resolution, correct or not, of factual elements of the offense
charged.'30  The majority explicitly repudiated the "convictability"
concept of Lee.13 1 Instead, the Court accepted Marlin Linen's "defini-
tion of acquittal" as the correct characterization of cases that are final
for double jeopardy purposes. 132 Therefore, defendant's decision to
move for dismissal before the factfinder's resolution of guilt was a
choice to forego the chance for a final judgment that would erect a
barrier to government appeal. '33
Like the Court in Martin Linen,'34 the Scott majority did not pre-
cisely define the meaning of "a resolution, correct or not, of some or all
of the factual elements of the offense charged."' 135 The Court did find
that evidence insufficient to support a conviction, as a basis for resolu-
tion, would come within the definition. 136  Further, a defendant who
successfully established an entrapment or insanity defense would have
factual elements of the offense resolved in his favor because these af-
firmative defenses negate implicit elements of the offense.' 37 A finding
that defendant's rights of due process had been violated by preindict-
ment delay does not, however, comply with the definition. The Court
held a dismissal on this basis to be merely a judgment that defendant
129. Id. (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949)).
130. Id. at 99-100.
131. Id. at 96-97. See notes 82, 101-07 supra and accompanying text.
132. 437 U.S. at 97. See notes 73-76 supra and accompanying text.
133. 437 U.S. at 98-99.
We think that in a case such as this the defendant, by deliberately choosing to seek
termination of the proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or inno-
cence of the offense of which he is accused, suffers no injury cognizable under the
Double Jeopardy Clause if the Government is permitted to appeal from such a ruling of
the trial court in favor of the defendant. . . .[W]e conclude that the Double Jeopardy
Clause, which guards against Government oppression, does not relieve a defendant from
the consequences of his voluntary choice.
Id
134. See note 75 supra.
135. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97 (1978) (quoting United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977)).
136. Id. The majority implied that a rule 29(c) acquittal would be appealable if based on a
determination other than insufficiency of evidence. "Where the court, before the jury returns a
verdict, enters a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 29, appeal will be barred
only when 'it is plain that the District Court ... evaluated the Government's evidence and deter-
mined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction."' Id (emphasis added) (quoting
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977)).
137. Id. at 97-98.
Number 1]
Washington University Open Scholarship
134 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 58:117
was constitutionally insulated from punishment, not that defendant did
not commit the offense charged.1 38 On the facts of Scott, therefore,
defendant's successful motion for dismissal on grounds of preindict-
ment delay erected no double jeopardy barrier to government ap-
peal. 139
Four members of the Court dissented in an opinion written by Jus-
tice Brennan. 40 The dissenters argued that implicit in the Wilson view
of the underlying purpose of the double jeopardy clause-prevention
of multiple prosecutions of a defendant for the same offense-was the
rule that the government has only "one complete opportunity to con-
vict an accused."' 14 1 In contrast to the majority, the dissent believed
that a termination in defendant's favor terminates the prosecution's
"one complete opportunity" as well, barring both retrial and govern-
ment appeal. 142 Borrowing from Lee, the dissenters equated a termina-
tion in defendant's favor with a decision that defendant "simply cannot
be convicted of the offense charged."' 143 Thus, they contended, a mid-
trial dismissal based on a determination that defendant was not con-
victable-a termination the dissent would not treat differently from an
acquittal-bars government appeal. 44 Allowing the government more
than one complete opportunity to convict, the dissenters argued, sub-
jects a defendant to harassment 4 5 and the possibility of an unjust con-
138. Id at 98.
139. Id at 98-99.
140. Joining Justice Brennan were Justices White, Marshall, and Stevens. Id. at 101 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 104-05.
Accordingly, the policies of the Double Jeopardy Clause mandate that the Government
be afforded but one complete opportunity to convict an accused and that when the first
proceeding terminates in a final judgment favorable to the defendant any retrial be
barred. The rule as to acquittals can only be understood as simply an application of this
larger principle.
Id at 105 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
142. Id. at 104-05. See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
143. 437 U.S. at 105 & n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See notes 82, 101-07 supra and accompa-
nying text.
144. 437 U.S. at 102, 106-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
145. Id at 105-07. The dissent's "one complete opportunity" rule attaches no significance to
defendant's choice to move for dismissal. See notes 121-28 supra and accompanying text. Like
the Court in Lee, the dissent would focus solely on the nature of the termination. 437 U.S. at 105
& n.5, 109 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Mistrials, whether the result of defendant's successful
motion or not, have distinguishable double jeopardy consequences because they are not termina-
tions in defendant's favor. Thus, according to the dissent, "the Government could not be said to
have had a complete opportunity to convict the accused." Id at 109 n.6.
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viction, the basis of the finality concern.' 46 Therefore, the dissent
would have reaffirmed Jenkins and Lee.' 47
The dissent focused its attack on the majority's conclusion that only
resolutions, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the
offense charged were to be accorded finality for double jeopardy pur-
poses.' 48 Justice Brennan characterized this conclusion as an attempt
to distinguish between "'true acquittals'" and other terminations in
defendant's favor. 149 This conclusion, according to the dissent, also im-
plicitly assumes that the rule barring appeal of acquittals rested on a
determination that defendant was factually innocent. 50 Arguing that
this assumption is untenable,' 5' Justice Brennan simply rejected' 52 the
majority's assertion that defendant suffers no injury cognizable under
the double jeopardy clause when the government is allowed to appeal a
midtrial dismissal granted on "a basis unrelated to factual guilt or in-
nocence.""' - He contended that defendant's injury would be threefold:
(1) the government would be permitted a second chance to persuade a
trier of fact of defendant's guilt; (2) the government would be able to
strengthen any weaknesses in its case; and (3) the government would
subject defendant to the expense and anxiety of a second trial. 54 The
first two facets of this injury relate to the finality principle; the third
relates to prevention of harassment.' 5 To the dissent, therefore, the
absence of a resolution of defendant's factual guilt could alter neither
the fact nor the nature of the injury to defendant's rights under the
double jeopardy clause.
Apart from objections to the majority's constitutional theory, Justice
Brennan argued that the majority's revised concept of finality defied
principled application.'56 In his view, the majority's distinction be-
tween defenses that provide legal justification for otherwise criminal
acts, such as insanity and entrapment, and those that arise from unlaw-
146. 437 U.S. at 105 n.4, 106 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See notes 25-31 supra and accompany-
ing text.
147. 437 U.S. at 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
148. See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
149. 437 U.S. at 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
150. Id at 108-10.
151. Id at 108.
152. Id at 103-10.
153. Id. at 99.
154. Id. at 106 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
155. See notes 25-36 supra and accompanying text.
156. 437 U.S. at 110-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ful or unconstitutional government behavior, such as preindictment de-
lay and statutes of limitation, is a matter of semantics.157 These
defenses, he maintained, require the application of legal standards to
evidence, not merely factual resolutions.'-" More importantly, all of
these defenses generally require evaluation of evidence adduced at
trial. Retrial of a defendant after a successful government appeal had
overcome one of these defenses would allow the government to capital-
ize on the increased probability of conviction afforded by multiple
prosecutions as well as subject defendant to possible harassment.1 59
IV.
The Court's increased exposure to double jeopardy convinced the
Scott majority that Jenkins sacrificed the public's interest "in insuring
that justice is meted out to offenders" to an overbroad reading of the
constitutional limits on government appeals.' 60 This conclusion is con-
sistent with the reasoning employed in a line of cases concerning the
double jeopardy consequences of mistrials.16 1 In these cases the Court
weighed the public's interest in conviction against defendants' rights.' 62
Yet, the Court's reasoning in Scott cannot fairly be characterized as a
balancing analysis. The majority held that the balance necessarily
tipped in the government's favor because defendant jumped off the
scale by successfully moving for a midtrial dismissal on grounds unre-
lated to factual guilt or innocence.' 63 The insubstantiality of defend-
ants' rights, in the majority's analysis, derives from its revised
perception of the roles of finality and prevention of harassment.' 64
Thus, the validity of the Court's policy judgment that Jenkins disserved
the public interest rests on the soundness of its two conclusions con-
cerning proper roles for finality and harassment.
Scott's conclusion that defendant's successful motion for dismissal
rendered irrelevant any concern for prevention of harassment was
157. Id at 110-16.
158. Id at 113-14.
159. Id at 110-16.
160. Id at 86-87.
161. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600
(1976); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); United States v. Join, 400 U.S. 470 (1971);
Note, Mistrals and Double Jeopardy, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 169 (1977).
162. See, e.g., Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 470-71 (1973).
163. See notes 121-28 supra and accompanying text.
164. See 437 U.S. at 87-101; notes 119-20 supra and accompanying text.
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based on its determination that defendant is responsible for any possi-
ble reprosecution.165 The Court imported this notion of responsibility
from the double jeopardy doctrine concerning mistrials,166 but failed to
support its reasoning through any comparison of the nature of a motion
for mistrial with that of a motion for dismissal. It can hardly be said
that Lee permits the conclusion that the motions are essentially the
same. 67 Lee's holding that the dismissal of the indictment was func-
tionally indistinguishable from a mistrial ruling was intimately tied to
the facts of that case. 6 Indeed, the Lee Court's recasting of the trial
court's dismissal as a functional mistrial recognized the distinctions be-
tween mistrials and dismissals, at least for double jeopardy purposes. 169
In general, a mistrial ruling is a recognition of a defect in the trial
court proceeding itself.70 Protected by the double jeopardy clause at
least to the extent that clearly intentional actions by the judge or prose-
cutor will bar retrial,' 7' a defendant must weigh the increased
probability of conviction resulting from the defect in the first proceed-
ing against that resulting from the government's second chance before
another trier of fact. A motion to dismiss, however, is generally
grounded on a defect in the government's case, not the particular pro-
ceeding. 172 The ability of a defendant to move for dismissal before
trial 73 emphasizes this distinction. In addition, this distinction is man-
ifested, as the dissent points out, by the frequent necessity for consider-
ation of facts and evidence adduced at trial before a ruling or a motion
to dismiss. 174 Dependence on trial evidence seems especially apparent
when a defendant asserts that the government's prejudicial preindict-
ment delay makes a fair trial impossible.175  If, as in Scott, the trial
165. See notes 119, 121-28 supra and accompanying text.
166. See notes 121-24 supra and accompanying text.
167. See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
168. See notes 83-88 supra and accompanying text. "In Lee, we treated the dismissal as the
equivalent of a mistrial because both the trial judge and the parties had so regarded it." United
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. at 109 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
170. See notes 85-86 supra and accompanying text. See generally Note, supra note 161, at 172;
Note, supra note 3, at 1838.
171. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 94 (1978); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600,
611 (1976).
172. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 94 (1978); Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 29-30
(1977); Note, supra note 3.
173. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 84, 95 (1978).
174. See id at 111-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
175. Id
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court grants, on grounds of preindictment delay, a midtrial dismissal
motion that was raised in timely fashion pretrial, 7 6 then the depen-
dence of the ruling on evidence adduced at trial is plain.
The essential distinction between mistrials and dismissals would ap-
pear to make the majority's application of mistrial doctrine to the
double jeopardy consequences of a midtrial dismissal, at best, inappro-
priate. Yet, the majority's willingness to gloss over the distinction is
one facet of the Court's profound revision of the role of harassment as
an underlying purpose of the double jeopardy clause. Finality, not har-
assment, is the primary focus of the majority's concern. 7 7 The differ-
ence between a mistrial and dismissal is irrelevant because neither
termination is inevitably a final judgment under Scott's reconstructed
concept of finality. Scott holds that defendant's choice to seek a mid-
trial termination that is not a final judgment obviates any need to con-
sider harassment, whether or not the termination is a mistrial, a
functional mistrial, or a dismissal that qualifies as a termination in de-
fendant's favor.'78 Thus, the Court's conclusion that government ap-
peal and possible reprosecution inflict no injury on Scott cognizable
under the double jeopardy clause 17 9-such as the type of harassment
condemned in Green, 8 ° Jenkins,'8' and Martin Linen182-- stems princi-
pally from its revised view of finality.' 83
By allowing government appeal of dismissals, the Court's new con-
cept of finality is consistent with congressional understandings of the
double jeopardy limits on government appeals.' 84 The Scott majority,
however, did not rely at all on the legislative history of the 1971 Crimi-
nal Appeals Act.'85 Instead, the majority lifted AMartin Linen's puzzling
"definition" of acquittal out of the context of that case and simply as-
serted that it accurately characterized final judgments for the purpose
176. Id. at 84.
177. By directing their attack primarily against the majority's new concept of finality, the dis-
sent seems to have recognized the key role that finality played in the majority's analysis. See text
accompanying note 148 supra; note 132 supra and accompanying text.
178. See notes 119-29 supra and accompanying text.
179. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 99 (1978).
180. See note 33 supra.
181. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
182. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
183. See notes 129-33 supra and accompanying text.
184. See notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text.
185. Id
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of double jeopardy.1 6 Like the Court in Martin Linen, the Scott ma-
jority included within this definition those terminations which, argua-
bly, are not resolutions of factual elements of the offense charged.' 87
Scott explicitly found that a ruling that the evidence is insufficient to
convict is a final judgment. 88 Yet, this determination could be based
solely on the government's failure to sustain its burden of proof rather
than on a finding that defendant did not, in fact, commit the act al-
leged. Defendant may indeed be factually guilty and, in addition, con-
victable, if the burden of proof were lowered to a preponderance of the
evidence. When a court relies on stipulated facts to rule that the evi-
dence is insufficient to convict, it is especially difficult to regard this
determination as a resolution of factual elements in defendant's
favor. 189 The talismanic quality of the majority's definition of finality
is also indicated by its inclusion of egregiously erroneous acquittals. 190
A trial court might reach the legal conclusion that evidence is insuffi-
cient to convict after first erroneously excluding most of the govern-
ment's evidence.' 9' To label a judgment of acquittal entered on this
basis a resolution of factual elements of the offense charged seems pri-
marily a matter of formalistic terminology. To be sure, the majority
allows for the possibility of incorrect, yet final resolutions.192 Still, it
strains even imagination to label Fong Boo as a resolution of factual
elements of the offense charged, except as a matter of definition. 93 Fi-
nally, the majority's assertion that an acquittal based on a finding of
186. 437 U.S. at 97.
187. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
188. 437 U.S. at 97-98; see notes 134-37 supra and accompanying text.
189. See 437 U.S. at 102 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Finch v. United States, 433 U.S. 676
(1977); ef. Note, supra note 3, at 1836 ("Any ruling which assumes the prosecutor's factual allega-
tions to be true or which is based on undisputed facts would be treated as a ruling of law .... .
190. 437 U.S. at 90-91, 97-98.
191. See United States v. Sanabria, 437 U.S. 54 (1978).
In Sanabria, the District Court, acting on the defendant's motions, made a series of
erroneous legal rulings which began with an erroneous construction of the indictment
and culminated in the exclusion of most of the evidence of defendant's guilt. The trial
court then granted defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the
remaining evidence was insufficient. Sanabria held that the midtrial termination of the
prosecution erected an absolute bar to any further proceedings against the defendant,
and we reached that result even though the rulings which led to the acquittal were purely
legal determinations, unrelated to any question of defendant's factual guilt, and had
been precipitated entirely by the defendant's "voluntary choice" to seek a narrow con-
struction of his indictment.
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 110 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
192. See 437 U.S. at 97.
193. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
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entrapment would be final for double jeopardy purposes 94 reveals the
artificial nature of the requisite factual resolution for finality. Although
the prevailing view is that a defendant successfully demonstrating en-
trapment has proved the absence of an implicit element of the offense
charged, 195 this view is but one legal theory. The split in the Supreme
Court over the conceptual nature of entrapment' 96 and the number of
jurisdictions that regard entrapment as a check on government behav-
ior rather than as a measure of defendants' predisposition 97 demon-
strate that a finding of entrapment is only theoretically a resolution of
factual elements of the offense charged.
Neither exact nor precise, Scott's new principle of finality manifests
the substantial overlap between Lee's concept of convictability and the
concept of factual innocence. 198 At the very least, this overlap is rough-
ly congruent with the grey area between questions of fact and questions
of law. 199 Principled separation of non-convictability and factual inno-
cence for double jeopardy purposes, therefore, seems especially diffi-
cult-as the Court in Jenkins and Lee appeared to recognize.2 0
Whether or not a termination in defendant's favor is based on a finding
of factual innocence or non-convictability, government appeal, as the
Scott dissent demonstrates, subjects defendants to possible harassment
and enhanced probability of conviction.20 1 The majority has simply
drawn a line. In retrospect, the line drawing in Jenkins, by comparison,
seems very bright indeed.
CONCLUSION
Combined with the policy conclusion that Jenkins disserved the pub-
lie's interest in convicting alleged offenders, Scott's reconstructed no-
194. See 437 U.S. at 97-99.
195. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). See also Sherman v. United States, 356
U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
196. Interestingly, the Justices divided in the Scott case very similarly to the way they split in
Russell, the leading entrapment case. In Scoft Justices Rehnquist, Burger, Powell, Stewart, and
Blackmun formed the majority. Justices Brennan, Marshall, White, and Stevens dissented. In
Russell Justices Rehnquist, Burger, Powell, White, and Blackmun formed the majority. Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, and Douglas dissented. See note 195 supra.
197. This is the position of the dissent in Rssell and is the state of the law in several jurisdic-
tions. See Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REv. 163 (1976).
198. See notes 101-07 supra and accompanying text.
199. Id
200. Id See also notes 77-81 supra and accompanying text.
201. See notes 154-55 supra and accompanying text.
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tions of finality and harassment significantly restrict the applicability of
the double jeopardy clause. The extent to which lower courts will look
to this policy conclusion in grappling with Scott's uncertain concept of
finality is an open question, but one that in large measure will deter-
mine just how narrowly the Court has circumscribed defendants'
double jeopardy rights.
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